Reply
  • Disclaimer mods this isn’t a anti-woman thread this is for genuine discussion

    I get the economy is rough rn but you could definitely get a smoothie and a wrap for $30 and the fact she screenshoted and posted the messages for the world to see is wild

  • lil ufo 🛸
    Feb 28

    how do I feel?
    let's talk about it

  • lil ufo 🛸
    Feb 28

    this is just lazy ragebait

  • Last $30

  • plants 🌻
    Feb 28
    ·
    4 replies

    bro i dont even care about this s*** at all! shut up!

  • Feb 28
    plants

    bro i dont even care about this s*** at all! shut up!

  • plants

    bro i dont even care about this s*** at all! shut up!

  • Mar 1
    ·
    1 reply

    So he just randomly gave her $30? Lol f***ing loser

  • plants

    bro i dont even care about this s*** at all! shut up!

    how much a vegan meal?

  • f*** mymixtapes were on jiggatvdotcom

  • Pointless gender war s*** . Yawn

  • Mar 1
    ·
    1 reply
    TsunamiPapi

    So he just randomly gave her $30? Lol f***ing loser

    Some people believe love can be bought

  • Tubig 🌊
    Mar 1

    I don’t feel anything about this. Don’t chase gold diggers. Next.

  • She for the skreets

  • If he’s sending his last 30 dollars dude is lowkey in it for the embarrassment kink at that point

  • I think that We are grateful to Yukiko Asada for her commentary (Asada 2010), as it gives us an opportunity to reiterate and clarify several points from our original article. Although we appreciate her comments, we believe that they are based on a fundamental misreading of our article.

    Asada claims that we recommend “that a***ysts use relative inequality measures when concerned only about health inequality … but use absolute inequality measures when concerned also about other issues, such as the population's overall level of health and each group's level of health” (617). Actually, we recommend nothing of the sort. As we state in our conclusion,

    Researchers should recognize that relying exclusively on a single measure of health inequality may implicitly endorse normative judgments and that this endorsement is an unavoidable byproduct of the structure of those measures…. We thus urge researchers to avoid uncritically using a single measure (such as a rate ratio) simply because it is widely accepted practice to do so, and to consider the implicit normative judgments embedded in many measures of inequality. (Harper et al. 2010, 22)

    Asada has misread our description of the implicit value judgments embedded in some measures as a prescription for how to use those measures.

    Asada also has misread the general purpose of our article, when she states that our “effort to explore the ‘best metric for assessing trends in inequality’ is commendable” (617). The seven words that Asada quotes from our article are from a rhetorical question that we used to illustrate exactly the opposite: that there are no inherently “best” metrics for assessing inequality. Our point is that choosing among inequality measures always requires a normative judgment, so one cannot identify a single “best metric” without first determining what “best” means in a given situation. As we state in our conclusion, “Because inequality is a complex, multidimensional concept, we do not believe that there is a single, one-size-fits-all strategy for determining how best to measure and interpret health inequalities” (Harper et al. 2010, 22).

    Asada contends that the relationship between population health and inequality is “more complex than suggested by our a***ysis” (617). We certainly agree on the complexity of this issue, which is why our examples address complex cases in which absolute and relative measures disagree on the direction and magnitude of inequality trends. In contrast, Asada chooses a less compelling example to illustrate her argument. She argues that one must distinguish between “single population” and “multiple population” cases when measuring inequality, observing that in the single population cases, both absolute and relative measures “assess only inequality,” since neither provides any information about underlying levels of health. Although this point is technically correct, it misses the larger issue. The point of our article was that difficulties arise not when trying to determine whether inequalities exist(in a cross-sectional comparison), but whether some are worse than others (comparing across different populations or over time).

    This problem is evident even in Asada's “single population” case, in which the respective life expectancies of ten and twenty years for men and women generate a ten-year absolute and a 50 percent relative difference for men. She maintains that the same ten-year female advantage in life expectancy could be observed if males lived for only ten years and that the same 50 percent male deficit could be observed if they lived for sixty years. This is true, but depending on whether one favors relative or absolute inequality, Asada's alternative scenarios lead to opposing conclusions about which situation is better or worse. The “same 50 percent difference” in life expectancies of sixty and ninety occurs only when the absolute inequality is increased from ten to thirty years. Similarly, the “same ten-year difference” in life expectancies of ten and twenty increases the relative inequality from a 50 to a 100 percent difference. Unless we first specify that our moral concern is with either absolute or relative inequality, we cannot determine conclusively that these alternative scenarios demonstrate the “same” level of inequality.

    Asada also seems to think that her hypothetical “multiple population” example illustrates a deficiency in our argument. In fact, it illustrates the kind of terminological confusion that we discussed in our original article. Asada posits a population in which women live ten years longer than men do, which is subject to two interventions that increase life expectancy:

    If all the persons in this society take one red pill each, the life expectancy of both men and women will increase by twenty-five years, thereby increasing it to forty-five years and fifty-five years, respectively. But if all persons take one blue pill each, the life expectancy of both men and women will double, thereby increasing it to forty years and sixty years, respectively. (618–19)

    Here Asada expresses the impact of the red pill in absolute terms (a fixed twenty-five-year increase in life expectancy) and the impact of the blue pill in relative terms (a doubling of life expectancy), indicating that both pills distribute benefits equally to men and women. However, it is also correct to state that the red pill increases life expectancy by 225 percent for men and by only 183 percent for women, while the blue pill increases life expectancy by twenty years for men and thirty years for women. So which is the “better” intervention in regard to equality? On the basis of Asada's description alone, we would conclude that they are equivalent, since both act equally on men and women. But our alternative description indicates that the red pill disproportionately benefits men and the blue pill disproportionately benefits women. To put it another way, the red pill has no impact on the life expectancy difference, but reduces the ratio of male-to-female life expectancy from 1.5 to 1.2. The blue pill, in contrast, has no impact on the ratio but increases the difference in life expectancy between men and women from ten to twenty years. How do we decide which is the better intervention for equity? As we argued in our original article, since all these ways of expressing the effects of the interventions are technically correct, we cannot answer this question unless we first specify what “better” means in this particular case.

    We do agree with Asada that a better integration of moral judgments and measurement is essential. We also applaud the efforts of Gakidou, Murray, and Frenk (2002) to investigate how individuals evaluate multiple dimensions of inequality. Indeed, their finding that a preference for absolute or relative measures varies according to s***and country of origin supports our contention that there is no universal “best metric” for evaluating inequality.

  • plants

    bro i dont even care about this s*** at all! shut up!

  • its ragebait op dont think about it too much the powers that b want you to pay attention to this so you dont think about the real issues

  • KIDBlNO

    Some people believe love can be bought

    F***ing lame, I don’t feel sorry for him

  • Mar 1

    Hate that site

  • keep this on twitter

  • #poptheballoontwitter

  • Bruh y'all purposely go for birds that look like they ask for money for any inconvenience they have I can spot a girl like that from the first few messages and I’m onto the next we ain’t paying s*** until you give something back lmao

  • Mar 1
    ·
    edited

    Do regular dudes genuinely date women like this? What do they get out of it?

    Just go to an escort atp bc wtf