CrimsonArk

4y

It might be too late even for that though in some instances.

I imagine any prominent leftists of today would be throughly f***ed under this scenario.

Like, if not imprisoned, straight executed.

SEGA GOON

4y

If you wanna get blackpilled, look up escort forums and see what they say about s***tourism

Therea a Pattaya subreddit and ppl there are lamenting how Thai women got richer than before so the prostitution numbers and availability aint what it used to be in the golden times

math fifty

4y

@Scratchin_Bandit bout to start black shirts and reds

krishna bound

4y

im gonna keep it real wit you chief im not trying to be mean but you need to get off the the internet and disconnect from the media circuit too for a bit this is nowhere near becoming a reality in the near future and you're getting yourself really scared over the wrong things. there are many many terrible issues in the US today and there always have been but this stuff you're saying is like near schizo tier

deadacc

4y

krishna i remember a while back you were talking about baathism is the correct ideology for you as marxism doesn't properly address non-base based struggle and conflict (hope im not misconstruing what you said)

was reading overdetermination and contradiction and this bit popped out at me that addressed this phenomenon pretty well imo

We should not think that this means a new technical distribution of roles imposed by the multiplication of new terms. How are these new terms arranged? On the one hand, the structure (the economic base: the forces of production and the relations of production); on the other, the superstructure (the State and all the legal, political and ideological forms). We have seen that one could nevertheless attempt to maintain a Hegelian relation (the relation Hegel imposed between civil society and the State) between these two groups of categories: the relation between an essence and its phenomena. sublimated in the concept of the ‘truth of ... ‘. For Hegel, the State is the ‘truth of’ civil society, which, thanks to the action of the Ruse of Reason, is merely its own phenomenon consummated in it. For a Marx thus relegated to the rank of a Hobbes or a Locke, civil society would be nothing but the ‘truth of’ its phenomenon, the State, nothing but a Ruse which Economic Reason would then put at the service of a class: the ruling class. Unfortunately for this neat schema, this is not Marx. For him, this tacit identity (phenomenon-essence-truth-of ...) of the economic and the political disappears in favour of a new conception of the relation between determinant instances in the structure-superstructure complex which constitutes the essence of any social formation. Of course, these specific relations between structure and superstructure still deserve theoretical elaboration and investigation. However, Marx has at least given us the ‘two ends of the chain’, and has told us to find out what goes on between them: on the one hand, determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production; on the other, the relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific effectivity. This clearly breaks with the Hegelian principle of explanation by consciousness of self (ideology), but also with the Hegelian theme of phenomenon-essence-truth-of. We really are dealing with a new relationship between new terms.

p

Listen to the old Engels in 1890, taking the young ‘economists’ to task for not having understood that this was a new relationship. Production is the determinant factor, but only ‘in the last instance’: “More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted". Anyone who ‘twists this’ so that it says that the economic factor is the only determinant factor. ‘transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, empty phrase’. And as explanation: “The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure the political forms of the class struggle and its results: to wit constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles. and in m-any cases preponderate in determining their form . . .” The word ‘form’ should understood in its strongest sense, designating something quite different from the formal. As Engels also says: “The Prussian State also arose and developed from historical, ultimately economic causes. But it could scarcely be maintained without pedantry that among the many small states of North Germany, Brandenberg was specifically determined by economic necessity to become the great power embodying the economic, linguistic and, after the Reformation, also the religious difference between North and South, and not by other elements as well (above all by the entanglement with Poland, owing to the possession of Prussia, and hence with international political relations which were indeed also decisive in the formation of the Austrian dynastic power)".

deadacc

4y

krishna i remember a while back you were talking about baathism is the correct ideology for you as marxism doesn't properly address non-base based struggle and conflict (hope im not misconstruing what you said)

was reading overdetermination and contradiction and this bit popped out at me that addressed this phenomenon pretty well imo

We should not think that this means a new technical distribution of roles imposed by the multiplication of new terms. How are these new terms arranged? On the one hand, the structure (the economic base: the forces of production and the relations of production); on the other, the superstructure (the State and all the legal, political and ideological forms). We have seen that one could nevertheless attempt to maintain a Hegelian relation (the relation Hegel imposed between civil society and the State) between these two groups of categories: the relation between an essence and its phenomena. sublimated in the concept of the ‘truth of ... ‘. For Hegel, the State is the ‘truth of’ civil society, which, thanks to the action of the Ruse of Reason, is merely its own phenomenon consummated in it. For a Marx thus relegated to the rank of a Hobbes or a Locke, civil society would be nothing but the ‘truth of’ its phenomenon, the State, nothing but a Ruse which Economic Reason would then put at the service of a class: the ruling class. Unfortunately for this neat schema, this is not Marx. For him, this tacit identity (phenomenon-essence-truth-of ...) of the economic and the political disappears in favour of a new conception of the relation between determinant instances in the structure-superstructure complex which constitutes the essence of any social formation. Of course, these specific relations between structure and superstructure still deserve theoretical elaboration and investigation. However, Marx has at least given us the ‘two ends of the chain’, and has told us to find out what goes on between them: on the one hand, determination in the last instance by the (economic) mode of production; on the other, the relative autonomy of the superstructures and their specific effectivity. This clearly breaks with the Hegelian principle of explanation by consciousness of self (ideology), but also with the Hegelian theme of phenomenon-essence-truth-of. We really are dealing with a new relationship between new terms.

p

Listen to the old Engels in 1890, taking the young ‘economists’ to task for not having understood that this was a new relationship. Production is the determinant factor, but only ‘in the last instance’: “More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted". Anyone who ‘twists this’ so that it says that the economic factor is the only determinant factor. ‘transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, empty phrase’. And as explanation: “The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure the political forms of the class struggle and its results: to wit constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles. and in m-any cases preponderate in determining their form . . .” The word ‘form’ should understood in its strongest sense, designating something quite different from the formal. As Engels also says: “The Prussian State also arose and developed from historical, ultimately economic causes. But it could scarcely be maintained without pedantry that among the many small states of North Germany, Brandenberg was specifically determined by economic necessity to become the great power embodying the economic, linguistic and, after the Reformation, also the religious difference between North and South, and not by other elements as well (above all by the entanglement with Poland, owing to the possession of Prussia, and hence with international political relations which were indeed also decisive in the formation of the Austrian dynastic power)".

krishna bound

4y

i don't intrinsically consider myself a baathist or anything specific per-se, which is why when people ask me what i am i usually just don't respond. i do think there is a lot of worthwhile literature and history as related to baathism though. the conversation you're referring to i believe i was just explaining the origins of baathism and why they diverged from marx despite its founders being marxist scholars, but also why I had certain agreements with parts of those divergences.

i'll start off my saying i do like althusser and i have read him before. as i've mentioned elsewhere in the thread, I do also like people like Baudillard & Debord on this, with ideas like the Spectacle and how these address similar phenomena as well. I do think Althusser's theorization on autonomous superstructural phenomena is meaningful and for the most part I do think the observation about the relation back to the base dialectically is correct. However, the overdetermination of phenomena autonomously I do think is also a misnomer to call a contradiction - something he does address himself to be fair. However, I think the real distinction here philosophically depends on if you look at dialectics from the angle of Monism or Dualism (maybe not textually, but at least in maybe a semiotic sense). If you believe in the dialectical model, you do need to ultimately decide where the base and super-structure have a dualistic difference or exist in a more monistic sense. While in some form of practicality, this is almost the same thing, there are small nuances here which exist outside of just theory. Now ultimately this does get more into (zizek sniff) ideology, but so does the work of like everyone else mentioned above (Althusser included), so if you're going to get into philosophy like this, you may as well stay in that territory.

In response to this phenomena, I don't think reactions need to inherently differentiate in terms of pragmatic quantification or something of superstructural issues vs base issues. I think falling prey to the need to "humanize" observations of natural phenomena by subjecting them to same apparatus as arbitrary societal social politics is why ideologies eventually become derivative or meaningless. However, I don't know if I'd also say this is a "contradiction" per-se, as it seems more like just a limit of the understanding of how humans en-masse (and how in attempting for an individual to collectivize ideas themselves to build a theoretical system, alternatively) failure to differentiate themselves from reigning structures. Now all of this of course plays back into the same autonomy Althusser is talking about, and how this all rides on top of the base ultimately.

However, you do also have to then think - related back to the dualism vs monism idea - about how if this rides so much on the base itself, how much of this is actually itself therefore differentiable from the base, if the base is so intertwined in the influence of these superstructural phenomena that the tangle of the structure in and of itself will never separate from the base. The interpretation of this and how to think about that autonomy - is that really a contradiction then for example? I believe it only becomes one if you start to think about contradiction from the angle of putting it within the framing of the societal need to shape it into a politically meaningful system, otherwise it seems no less contradictory in cross-influence that of how natural elements also cross-interact.

Womanpuncher69

4y

is the whole monoism and the dualism aspect u referring to the same as the one divides into two or two synthesis into one

Lou

4y

soCIAlism

Lein

4y

He going full fash huh

krishna bound

4y

i don't intrinsically consider myself a baathist or anything specific per-se, which is why when people ask me what i am i usually just don't respond. i do think there is a lot of worthwhile literature and history as related to baathism though. the conversation you're referring to i believe i was just explaining the origins of baathism and why they diverged from marx despite its founders being marxist scholars, but also why I had certain agreements with parts of those divergences.

i'll start off my saying i do like althusser and i have read him before. as i've mentioned elsewhere in the thread, I do also like people like Baudillard & Debord on this, with ideas like the Spectacle and how these address similar phenomena as well. I do think Althusser's theorization on autonomous superstructural phenomena is meaningful and for the most part I do think the observation about the relation back to the base dialectically is correct. However, the overdetermination of phenomena autonomously I do think is also a misnomer to call a contradiction - something he does address himself to be fair. However, I think the real distinction here philosophically depends on if you look at dialectics from the angle of Monism or Dualism (maybe not textually, but at least in maybe a semiotic sense). If you believe in the dialectical model, you do need to ultimately decide where the base and super-structure have a dualistic difference or exist in a more monistic sense. While in some form of practicality, this is almost the same thing, there are small nuances here which exist outside of just theory. Now ultimately this does get more into (zizek sniff) ideology, but so does the work of like everyone else mentioned above (Althusser included), so if you're going to get into philosophy like this, you may as well stay in that territory.

In response to this phenomena, I don't think reactions need to inherently differentiate in terms of pragmatic quantification or something of superstructural issues vs base issues. I think falling prey to the need to "humanize" observations of natural phenomena by subjecting them to same apparatus as arbitrary societal social politics is why ideologies eventually become derivative or meaningless. However, I don't know if I'd also say this is a "contradiction" per-se, as it seems more like just a limit of the understanding of how humans en-masse (and how in attempting for an individual to collectivize ideas themselves to build a theoretical system, alternatively) failure to differentiate themselves from reigning structures. Now all of this of course plays back into the same autonomy Althusser is talking about, and how this all rides on top of the base ultimately.

However, you do also have to then think - related back to the dualism vs monism idea - about how if this rides so much on the base itself, how much of this is actually itself therefore differentiable from the base, if the base is so intertwined in the influence of these superstructural phenomena that the tangle of the structure in and of itself will never separate from the base. The interpretation of this and how to think about that autonomy - is that really a contradiction then for example? I believe it only becomes one if you start to think about contradiction from the angle of putting it within the framing of the societal need to shape it into a politically meaningful system, otherwise it seems no less contradictory in cross-influence that of how natural elements also cross-interact.

MyBallsAndMyWord

4y

You’d probably enjoy a lot of the Maoist theory and philosophy from the GPCR discussing base/superstructure and one divides into two

Scratchin Mamba

4y

Paying my respek to our fallen comrades at the Soviet War Memorial at Berlin .. salute

deadacc

4y

However, you do also have to then think - related back to the dualism vs monism idea - about how if this rides so much on the base itself, how much of this is actually itself therefore differentiable from the base, if the base is so intertwined in the influence of these superstructural phenomena that the tangle of the structure in and of itself will never separate from the base. The interpretation of this and how to think about that autonomy - is that really a contradiction then for example? I believe it only becomes one if you start to think about contradiction from the angle of putting it within the framing of the societal need to shape it into a politically meaningful system, otherwise it seems no less contradictory in cross-influence that of how natural elements also cross-interact.

I think the point Althusser is trying to correct in his usage of "overdetermination" is that many, many things are ultimately autonomous of the base and therefore any assumption of the superstructure simply arising from the base is just a negation of Hegel's idea that the base arises from the superstructure.

The important distinction from Hegel being that you must identify and determine the many cross-interactions of the "natural elements" many times in order to begin to calculate the "overdetermination", or the Hegelian idea of the contradiction. In this way he kind of sidesteps the monism or dualism debate, by gesturing towards the superstructure autonomously and separately determining many things while the combination of many things becomes the overdetermination and becomes the "whole" of monism.

it's a cheap way of saying both but i think viewing it from both ends is the correct way, in the sense that you might actually be trying to perceive reality in the most accurate and useful way to shape it.

In response to this phenomena, I don't think reactions need to inherently differentiate in terms of pragmatic quantification or something of superstructural issues vs base issues. I think falling prey to the need to "humanize" observations of natural phenomena by subjecting them to same apparatus as arbitrary societal social politics is why ideologies eventually become derivative or meaningless. However, I don't know if I'd also say this is a "contradiction" per-se, as it seems more like just a limit of the understanding of how humans en-masse (and how in attempting for an individual to collectivize ideas themselves to build a theoretical system, alternatively) failure to differentiate themselves from reigning structures. Now all of this of course plays back into the same autonomy Althusser is talking about, and how this all rides on top of the base ultimately.

in this way i think he is saying what you are saying here which is that "falling prey to the need to 'humanize' observations of natural phenomena by subjecting them to same apparatus as arbitrary societal social politics is why ideologies eventually become derivative or meaningless".

"Let us return to Lenin and thence to Marx. If it is true, as Leninist practice and reflection prove, that the revolutionary situation in Russia was precisely a result of the intense overdetermination of the basic class contradiction, we should perhaps ask what is exceptional about this ‘exceptional situation’, and whether, like all exceptions, this one does not clarify its rule – is not, unbeknown to the rule, the rule itself. For, after all, are we not always in exceptional situations? The failure of the 1849 Revolution in Germany was an exception, the failure in Paris in 1871 was an exception, the German Social-Democratic failure at the beginning of the twentieth century pending the chauvinist betrayal of 1914 was an exception . . . exceptions, but with respect to what? To nothing but the abstract, but comfortable and reassuring idea of a pure, simple ‘dialectical’ schema, which in its very simplicity seems to have retained a memory (or rediscovered the style) of the Hegelian model and its faith in the resolving ‘power’ of the abstract contradiction as such: in particular, the ‘beautiful’ contradiction between Capital and Labour. I do not deny that the ‘simplicity’ of this purified schema has answered to certain subjective necessities of the mobilisation of the masses; after all, we know perfectly well that the utopian forms of socialism also played a historical part, and played it well because they took the masses at the word of their consciousness, because if they are to be led forward, even (and above all) this is how they must be taken. One day it will be necessary to do what Marx and Engels did for utopian socialism, but this time for those still schematic-utopian forms of mass consciousness influenced by Marxism (even the consciousness of certain of its theoreticians) in the first stage of its history: a true historical study of the conditions and forms of that consciousness. In fact we find that all the important historical and political articles written by Marx and Engels during this period give us precisely the material for a preliminary reflection on these so-called ‘exceptions’. They draw from them the basic notion that the Capital-Labour contradiction is never simple, but always specified by the historically concrete forms and circumstances in which it is exercised. It is specified by the forms of the superstructure (the State, the dominant ideology, religion, politically organised movements, and so on); specified by the internal and external historical situation which determines it on the one hand as a function of the national past (completed or ‘relapsed’ bourgeois revolution, feudal exploitation eliminated wholly, partially or not at all, local ‘customs’ specific national traditions, even the ‘etiquette’ of political struggles and behaviour, etc.), and on the other as functions of the existing world context (what dominates it – competition of capitalist nations, or ‘imperialist internationalism’, or competition within imperialism, etc.), many of these phenomena deriving from the ‘law of uneven development’ in the Leninist sense."

i know althusser writes long as f*** but in essence it seems to me the same as what you wrote while also addressing the baathist's issue with marxism, being "unable to factor in non class contradiction".

the issue being that many, many "marxists" fall victim to the simplicity of the Hegelian framework - while totally being unaware of the vulgar revisionism hidden within the traditional explanation of the marxist dialectic. in fact, althusser (which i tend to agree with given that his is simply less simple than the hegelian position) claims that the simple contradiction can - almost - NEVER be the determining factor in inducing a revolutionary situation. in a way it is a baathist conclusion that "If ... a vast accumulation of ‘contradictions’ comes into play in the same court, some of which are radically heterogeneous – of different origins, different sense, different levels and points of application – but which nevertheless ‘merge’ into a ruptural unity, we can no longer talk of the sole, unique power of the general ‘contradiction’".

MyBallsAndMyWord

4y

this is some of the dumbest s*** I’ve ever read even by Fox News standards

https://www.foxnews.com/sports/college-football-communism-capitalism-chaos

MyBallsAndMyWord

4y

this is some of the dumbest s*** I’ve ever read even by Fox News standards

https://www.foxnews.com/sports/college-football-communism-capitalism-chaos

MyBallsAndMyWord

4y

this is some of the dumbest s*** I’ve ever read even by Fox News standards

https://www.foxnews.com/sports/college-football-communism-capitalism-chaos

MyBallsAndMyWord

4y

this is some of the dumbest s*** I’ve ever read even by Fox News standards

https://www.foxnews.com/sports/college-football-communism-capitalism-chaos

Scratchin Mamba

4y

Paying my respek to our fallen comrades at the Soviet War Memorial at Berlin .. salute