Post #400

🐟 👽 Thread getting moved outta misc 2023 I feel it

Feel the ocean breeze
Spanish girl and I got her on her knees
She from south America yeah she a 10
You can't see her golden eyes behind these Gucci lense

Yeah I'm getting money
F***ed her past tense
Music banging loud
And let's pass this
I'm really f***ing high in my defense
Yeah she tryna f*** I can see the pretense

He already down bad why you grieve him
She already got his money now he tries to leave him
Money regenerates like a zebra
Fish scale on my back like a blade
Don't get impaled
I ain't buy p**** even if it's on sale
Got a nini and I just took her to Zales
I was healthy all I had was kale
Now I'm on some nasty s***, I need some kale

Feel the ocean breeze
Spanish girl and I got her on her knees
She from south America yeah she a 10
You can't see these golden eyes behind these Gucci lense

Feel the ocean breeze
Spanish girl and I got her on her knees
She from south America yeah she a 10
You can't see her golden eyes behind these Gucci lense

I do not f***ing care
Everything I do is f***ing real
B**** I'm chilling in my mfkin layer

New whip and they staring at the lear
I'm miles past all my mfkin peers

I'm at the beach and I'm fishing off a pier
All love my life, so great if you don't that s*** weird
I lost some people yeah, I had to shed some tears

@KundaliniMeanie

Need a proofread

"Consider now a second line of rebuttal, one that rejects the premises of the critique of difference. In previous chapters I have set constructionism against the traditional view of language, upon which the present critique depends for its intelligibility. I have outlined profound problems inhering in the view that language is an instrument for bearing truth, on the one hand, and rational thought on the other. The constructionist is more likely to favor a pragmatic view of language, one in which the meaning of terms or propositions is dependent on its social usage. On this account, to say that another system of meaning differs from one's own is to assert that the composite of meaning-making conditions across different groups, times, and language histories is not identical. To reach agreement regarding the similarity of propositions or rationalities, then, is always a local achievement, and this achievement is no less relevant to matters of daily life than it is to scholarly argument. That is, academic assertions about the similarities and differences in meaning systems are themselves discursive achievements. And in the present context, assertions to the effect that Aristotelian physics dif- fers from Newtonian physics and that the Western conception of magic differs from that of the Szondi are more easily demonstrated than assertions about their identity. Differences can be convincingly demonstrated by con- temporary standards with a mere show of texts or practices; in contrast, to declare an identity requires arduous interpretive work. Constructionist declarations of contextual differences are not then grounded in empirical fact, but are simply more congenial to our contemporary forms of argumentation than their opposite. Most important, rather than reach an impasse of indeterminacy, the outcome of such arguments for the human sciences is a substantial broadening and enrichment of practices."

"To illustrate, theoretical stability favors pattern maintenance among scientists. What this effectively means is that the range of interesting or compelling predictions will also be delimited. Refinements and derivations will demand attention, but not "factual domains" outside the circumscribed ontology. For example, to the extent that psychological theories of perception remained "bottom-up," as they did for many years, scientists paid exclusive attention to the effects on perception of variables in the stimulus world. The more recent development of "top-down" formulations generated interest in genetic antecedents of perception, in the possibility of native proclivities. With the shift in theoretical perspective, from environmentalism to nativism, new research challenges emerged. With regard to the effects of theoretical discourse on cultural practice, theories of well-being primarily concerned with psychological processes such as psychoanalysis and cognitive therapy) have led to an almost exclusive concern with individual actions. Aberrant behavior is the result of problematic psychological processes, and treatment is directed at the defective individual. Yet, as theories of social systems enter into the vocabulary of the scientist (and thus into the culture more generally), we gain the option of viewing an individual's problems within the context of defective groups, families, educational systems, economic institutions, and the like. In effect, to remain in the phase of normal science is to circumscribe the of prediction, delimit the possibilities for solving problems, and reduce the opportunity for realizing human potential."

We may thus envision the scientific process as composed of two opposing tendencies. The first opts toward stabilizing meaning systems, sharpening prediction, and affirming traditional values. In Bakhtin's (1981) sense, meanings move in a centripetal direction, toward uniformity and exclusion. The second aims toward a transformation in which established patterns and values are challenged and the range of available alternatives, within both science and society, is broadened. A centrifugal thrust is set in motion, unsettling convention and admitting new discourses. Under conditions of stabilization, the optimal criteria of theoretical evaluation differ from those under conditions of transformation. Stabilization favors theories that lead to maximum social coordination and value articulation. But when transformation has priority, the theorist may approach the borders of absurdity, unsettling the sedimented presumptions, and arguing critically and audaciously At the same time, successful moves toward transformation will, in the end, give way to stabilization. As the audacious becomes commonplace, the metaphoric becomes literal, value possibilities are realized in new institutions, and transformational theory becomes normalized. Ideally, the human sciences should move through periods of stabilization, decay, challenge, growth, and subsequent stabilization. Although our theories do not thus move inexorably toward greater fidelity with nature and we come no nearer to "truth" through this process, we do offer to the culture an increasing range of predictive capacities and, most important for the human sciences, an increasing range of intelligibilities and practices."

"It is largely for these reasons that many scholars today find the modernist conception of human functioning morally vacuous. The view of the ideal individual as empiricist-scientist is one that leaves the individual with no sense of ethical direction, no means of evaluating right and wrong, and no motive for challenging the status quo. The scientist qua scientist has no moral standpoint. Scientists may generate knowledge of sophisticated weapons systems, but there is nothing in science itself that admonishes (or invites) their use. The only means by which good actions can be guaranteed, from this standpoint, is through socialization and education-essentially by stamping them in. Thus, questions of value are always solved at a one-step remove from the individual actor. The single individual is destined to act as others have designed, and they in turn as still others have dictated. At no point is unfettered deliberation of the good made possible. Nor is it clear what useful outcomes would be achieved through such consideration, since there are no standards of "the good" necessarily favored by empirical study, no means of deriving what should be from what is. Questions of value are, in effect abnegated."

• Realities and Relationships, Sounds in Social Construction. Kenneth J Gergen

He is spitting venom

Thermus aquaticus

"There is nothing about commitment to a theory of morality that produces a moral life, and nothing about a decent and fulfilling life that demands a moral language as accompaniment. Moral principles are related to action only by virtue of the social conventions in which one participates."

"When a real world is to be reflected by a mental world and the only means of determining the match is via the mental world, then the real world will always remain opaque and the relationship between the two inexplicable."

"Consider the empiricist alternative. Since the function of theories is to picture the world as it is, competition between theories approximates a zero-sum game: if one theory is accurate, discrepant voices can be eliminated. Framed in this way, the competition between radical behaviorism and cognitivism is a fight to the death: the two theories cannot simultaneously be true. And so the terrain of contemporary psychology is dotted with warring and hostile camps, and dialogue between encampments is minimal. Yet, when one enters the world of constructionist epistemology, such warfare proves irrelevant. The game is not zero-sum with objectivity serving as the arbiter among domains. Rather, each form of theoretical intelligibility-cognitive, behaviorist, phenomenological, psychoanalytic, and the like provides the culture with discursive vehicles for carrying out social life. As the number of theoretical intelligibilities within the profession expand, so the symbolic resources of the culture are augmented. To rid the world of psychological theory would be to impoverish the landscape of social interchange."

"The pervasive stance toward psychological discourse in Western culture is decidedly pictorial. We generally accept people's accounts of their subjective states as valid (at least for them). If we are sophisticated, we may wonder if they are fully aware of their feelings, or have been misled in an attempt to protect themselves from what is "really" there. And, if we are of a scientific bent, we may wish to know the distribution of various mental states (such as loneliness or depression) in the society more generally, the conditions under which they occur (such as stress or burnout), and the means by which they can be altered (the comparative efficacy of differing therapies). However, we are unlikely to question the existence of the reality to which such terms seem to refer; and because the prevailing ontology of mental life remains generally unchallenged, we seldom inquire into the utility or desirability of such terms in daily life. If the language exists because the mental states exist, there is little reason for critical appraisal of the language. By common standards, to disapprove of the language of the mind is tanta- mount to finding the shape of the earth disagreeable.

Yet, if we view psychological discourse from a pragmatic perspective, mental language loses its function as "truth bearing." One cannot claim the right to language use on the grounds that existing terms "name what there is." At the same time, we confront significant questions concerning the existing terminologies, for the "ways we talk" are intimately intertwined with patterns of cultural life. They sustain and support certain ways of doing things and prevent others from emerging. From the pragmatic perspective it is of paramount importance, then, to inquire into the effects of the prevailing vocabularies of the mind on human relationships. Given our goals for human betterment, do these vocabularies facilitate or obstruct? And, most important for our purposes, what kinds of social patterns does the existing vocabulary of psychological deficit facilitate (or prevent)? How do the terms of the mental health professions-terms such as "neurosis," "cognitive dysfunction," "depression," "post-traumatic stress disorder," "character disorder," "repression," "narcissism," and so on-function within the culture more generally? Do they lend themselves to desirable forms of human relationship, should the vocabulary be expanded, and are there more promising alternatives? There are no simple answers to such questions; neither is there widespread discussion. My purpose here is less to develop a final answer than to generate a forum for challenging dialogue."

"Objectivity is primarily a rhetorical achievement, and in relying on this rhetoric we may be threatening both survival and morality."

"Consider first the primitive narrative of stability. Although generally devoid of dramatic value, people's capacity to identify themselves as stable units has great utility within a culture. In important respects most relationships tend toward stable patterns, and indeed, it is stabilization that enables us to speak of cultural patterns, institutions, and individual identities at all. [Often such patterns become saturated with value; to rationalize them in this way is to sustain them over time. The societal demand for stability finds its functional counterpart in the ready accessibility of the stability narrative. To successfully negotiate social life one must be capable of making him or herself intelligible as an enduring, integral, or coherent identity. In certain political arenas, for example, it is essential to demonstrate that in spite of extended absences, one is "truly rooted" in the local culture and part of its future. Or to be able to show on the more personal level that one's love, parental commitment, honesty, moral ideals, and so on have been unfailing over time, even when their outward appearance is suspicious, may be essential to continuing a relationship. In close relationships people often wish to know that others "are what they seem," that certain characteristics en- dure across time. A major way of conveying such assurance is the stability narrative. In this sense, personality traits, moral character, and personal identity are not so much the givens of social life, the building blocks of relationship, but the outcomes of relationship itself. "To be" a person of any special kind is a social achievement and requires continual conversational attention."

pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SELFORG.html

Quietly working.